DOJ: Way Off Course in Shipyard Litigation

Aug 24, 2011, 7:20AM EST
DOJ: Way Off Course in Shipyard Litigation
At a time when every federal penny (seemingly) should count, the U.S. Department of Justice is embarking on an ill-advised, potentially expensive and ultimately counterproductive legal action against the U.S. Coast Guard’s primary shipbuilding contractor. Go figure…

  • Puzzling Posturing


Showing questionable wisdom, the United States and its justice department have filed suit against Bollinger Shipyards Inc., Bollinger Shipyards Lockport LLC and Halter Bollinger Joint Venture LLC. In general terms, the government alleges that the Louisiana shipbuilder misrepresented the hull strength of a series of vessels that it was improving and lengthening about five years ago. The first converted cutter, according to the government, suffered hull failure when put into service. Eventually, said the U.S. Justice Department in a prepared statement, “Efforts to repair the Matagorda and the other converted vessels were unsuccessful. The cutters are unseaworthy and have been taken out of service.”

As the government seeks damages from Bollinger for the loss of the eight vessels – the upgrades alone said to be worth about $95 million – the Coast Guard itself continues to struggle in an effort to renew an aging fleet and related equipment. Ten years after launching the aggressive, $25 billion so-called “Deepwater” program to do just that, the nation’s fifth military, uniformed service has little to show for the $7 billion already spent. The latest DOJ action, coming years after the work itself was complete, cannot hope to hide those failures.

 

Bollinger Responds

 

For its part, Bollinger responded to the suit by saying in a prepared statement dated August 17, “Since its founding, Bollinger Shipyards has operated on the principle that ‘quality is remembered long after the price is forgotten.’ Three generations of the Bollinger family have earned a spotless record for honest and fair dealing with every customer, including the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, our largest client. Since 1984, Bollinger has built every patrol boat the Coast Guard has purchased; to date some 122 have been delivered.”

 

The statement went on to say, “We are disappointed with the Department of Justice’s decision to file a complaint related to work completed in 2006. Throughout this process, Bollinger has been open and cooperative with the government, and we remain committed to providing the government all necessary information and assistance to bring this matter to a close. Bollinger has tried to find a way to resolve this matter short of litigation, but we are fully prepared to defend our good name aggressively in a court of law. As we have for the last 65 years, Bollinger will continue to deliver the highest quality and contract-compliant products to the United States Coast Guard and to each and every customer.”

 

Indeed, and as if to underscore their response, Bollinger this week also noted the launch of the U.S. Coast Guard’s second, 154-foot Fast Response Cutter from its Lockport, LA shipyards last Thursday. The event – according to the Coast Guard itself – marks a significant milestone in the Coast Guard’s acquisition of the Sentinel-class patrol boats. And, the third Fast Response Cutter is tentatively scheduled to be launched Nov. 10. Let’s sum up: 122 Coast Guard patrol boats delivered since 1984, an ongoing relationship with the Coast Guard (Bollinger’s largest client) and a continued record of typically delivering what the Coast Guard wants in a timely fashion. Not bad for an outfit now accused of misrepresenting the facts.

 

Blame Game

 

From where I sit, there is probably plenty of blame to go around, but don’t take my word for it. The recent (28 July) GAO Report about the Coast Guard’s Deepwater program is also telling. The 86-page Report, GAO-11-173, “Coast Guard: Action Needed As Approved Deepwater Program Remains Unachievable,” says, among other things, “The Deepwater Program continues to exceed the cost and schedule baselines approved by DHS in 2007.” None of that is any secret, of course, and the report goes on to list numerous problem and setbacks associated with the star-crossed efforts.

 

Central to the Coast Guard’s troubles in the Deepwater effort was its own failure to properly oversee the effort from the beginning. Coast Guard Commandant ADM Robert Papp himself was recently quoted as saying, "I'll be the first to admit, we weren't prepared to start spending this money and supervising a project this big." Leaving the details and supervision of the projects to the contractors themselves, the Coast Guard eventually lost control of the multi-billion dollar project. Today, a cash-strapped Congress is pushing back against what they characterize as inadequate steps by the Coast Guard to right their wildly off-course and over budget effort.

 

The government’s action against Bollinger also comes as a cost-conscious Congress, led by Rep. Frank Lobiondo (R - NJ), are on record as saying that they will no longer provide a “blank check” to the Coast Guard. And, while that makes sense on many levels, it also comes at a time when the Coast Guard’s efforts in the rapidly thawing Arctic are also ramping up significantly, with inadequate resources – particularly in way of icebreakers that can cost up to $1 billion each – to do the job.

Catch 22

 

In numerous interviews over the past few years, especially where it comes to Deepwater and ship acquisition efforts, the Coast Guard leadership has opted to look ahead, not behind. The party line has become, “Don’t look at where we’ve been; instead look how far we’ve come.” Fair enough. Today, however, and as the Coast Guard implores Congress to forget the past, the Department of Justice seems just as intent upon dredging it up. But, it doesn’t seem right to let them have it both ways, does it? Bollinger certainly won’t be afforded that luxury.

 

At the end of the day, you have to wonder how much it will cost Bollinger and ultimately, the U.S. taxpayers, to defend and prosecute a case from which virtually nothing good can come. Did the shipyard drop the ball or was the Coast Guard deficient in their contract administration? I honestly have no idea. Five years down the road, it is a curious time to be finding out. It will also be expensive. How many patrol boats could we be building with that money? Finally, and perhaps most importantly, who will build these boats and others, if and when, years from now, the government triumphs? – MarPro.

* * *

Joseph Keefe is the lead commentator of MaritimeProfessional.com. Additionally, he is Editor of both Maritime Professional and MarineNews print magazines. He can be reached at jkeefe@maritimeprofessional.com or at Keefe@marinelink.com. MaritimeProfessional.com is the largest business networking site devoted to the marine industry. Each day thousands of industry professionals around the world log on to network, connect, and communicate.

 
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Comments
Tony Andrews
Cannot agree more with your comments, you would think that the DOJ could spend more time and our tax $ dealing with the New Black Panther's intimidating, assulting and harrasing voters or the Fast & Furious scam but no, lets attack capitalism...shows just where this administration is, especially under Holder....vote conservative.
8/25/2011 11:38:44 AM
 
Donald Shelton
A parable for the day: A man has a very very large and heavy cart that has gone into a deep ditch along the side of a road. It is being pulled by a very small donkey. The donkey is struggling hard, but unsuccessfully to pull the wagon out of the ditch. While doing so, it is being severly beaten by the man with a large, nasty whip.

A passerby asks, "How can you expect that small donkey to pull such a large wagon out of that ditch?"

The man answers, "Do you not see the size of my whip?"

I leave it to you, dear reader, to assign the roles.
8/25/2011 12:04:06 PM
 
Ron Oyer
The ball lies in the court of the NAs that did the design. Bollingers success with the Coast Guard is sue in a large part to their use of Damen designs.
8/25/2011 12:30:59 PM
 
Michael DeKort
My name is Michael DeKort. I am the relator in the False Claims Act case filed in 2006 in order to recover the 123 refund from the current defendants, the prime contractors ICGS and joint venture Northrop Grumman. The U.S., myself and Lockheed Martin compromised and settled all claims regarding Lockheed Martin. However, I read your article and am quite concerned about its conclusion, and how it affects the Coast Guard, the taxpayer and the country and by your disregard of the relatively undisputed record facts and documents relating to the 123 fiasco. Your disregard of the record compiled in the United States District Court in Dallas, apparently lead you erroneous, misleading conclusions. Most harmful was your placement of fault on the back of the USCG. While their management may have left much to be desired, the Deepwater contract did not require any oversight of the contractors, nor did the contract require any services or consulting from the USCG. The Deepwater contract was a Performance Based contract and you totally missed that critical fact. More specifically, the Delivery Task Orders for all of the 110 conversions to 123s required the contractor, not the USCG, to do all of the design integration and all design and engineering required to produce a technically sound patrol boat which met the mandated performance specifications and applicable standards. The contractor, per the contract, was responsible for the adequacy of the design and the performance of the modified patrol boat—not the USCG, the customer in every respect.
Thus, from the beginning of project, the Coast Guard was never to be held accountable for any part of the contractor’s design, engineering or delivery of an apparent properly operating 123 foot patrol boat. Any installation of improper equipment or defective design or engineering was totally on the back of the contractor and its joint venturers. Notwithstanding 100% of the obligations accepted by the contractor, the Coast Guard’s Engineering Logistics Center (ELC) warned the contractors about hull design problems when ICGS/Northrop and Bollinger presented and promoted the 123s program to the USCG. If you want to review the scope of the contractors’ failures regarding the 123s, I would refer you to the Brief of Appellant for our appeal in US ex rel. DeKort v. ICGS, Northrop Grumman. The appeal succinctly states the issues, and it is more than adequately annotated. Neither contractor won anything on the merits at the District Court. Rather, the Court made an erroneous jurisdictional decision which we have appealed. Read it, and you will get an accurate picture of the fiasco. While Bollinger may share the blame, both Northrop Grumman and ICGS were responsible for anything improper done by Bollinger, their subcontractor. In fact, Northrop Grumman kept about $9 million of the budgeted $50 million of the expended modification funds for supervising Bollinger and its JV partner. Bollinger, through Northrop Grumman and ICGS, misrepresented material facts to the Coast Guard on multiple occasions regarding the hull design. They said all was well at every design review, when each boat was built and AFTER each hull buckled. The Coast Guard bears no responsibility whatsoever for the poor, systemic calculations, hull design flaws and/or false statements material to the contractors’ requests for payment from the USCG.
As for the DoJ who is bringing this “replication” of our whistleblower case, and the result it would have for the taxpayer and the country, let me address that by first posting your conclusion. “At a time when every federal penny (seemingly) should count, the U.S. Department of Justice is embarking on an ill-advised, potentially expensive and ultimately counterproductive legal action against the U.S. Coast Guard’s primary shipbuilding contractor. Go figure…”. Again, whoever wrote the article under your name failed to appreciate that the return of funds wrongfully obtained are significant amounts of money. Three times approximately $100 million is still a lot of taxpayer money, and the cost of the litigation compares favorably to the risk-reward considerations In the end, whatever judgment is recovered, it should be in the range of $150 million or more. Our claims are significantly larger due to additional claims we asserted. The litigation costs to the U.S. pale in comparison to the recoveries to which it is entitled under the False Claims Act It is everyone’s responsibility to go after contractor misconduct which contributes significantly to taxpayer losses and the resulting budget crisis. Is there no longer any will for accountability for contractors? Of course there is, and that is why the False Claims Act continues to be strengthened by Congress.
The contractors were delivered 8 operating 110 foot patrol boats. They were paid about $100 million for the modification of those 8 boats to 123 foot patrol boat. None of those boats will safely perform any mission required by the Deepwater contract. The contractors destroyed 8 working boats and kept $100 million for their destruction, never delivering performing 123s as required by the contract. The question is not why there is a whistleblower lawsuit that opened this wound, nor that the DOJ finally sued someone, but rather why aren’t there 100 other complainers who watched all of this happening. Who cares about the taxpayers losses of $100 million and the delivery of patrol boats unsafe for the USCG men and women? I did. And the DOJ does. Where are the rest of the you who watched the debacle unfold? Isn’t it time to come forward and communicate with my attorneys or the Department of Justice We will win without you, but we would much prefer to win with you.
As for Bollinger, a good track record does not excuse their poor workmanship and misleading conduct over the past 10 years. The 123 debacle was immensely avoidable. They knew that the boat could be lengthened properly, but that they underestimated how much that would cost. Instead of simply announcing that reality, they concealed those material facts and generated a financial and USCG disaster. We have alleged that the False Claims Act violations regarding hull design defects and other serious violations included the prime contractor ICGS, the prime contractor, and the joint venturer Northrop Grumman—which was delegated the ship modification responsibilities that it subcontracted to Bollinger. Even so, the United States has claimed that Bollinger also violated the False Claims Act, and it should bear its responsibility for its own conduct.
And as far as the Fast Response Cutter program is concerned there are reports that it has hull design flaw problems as well. Does the writer suggest that, given the 123s debacle, that we simply give ICGS, Northrop Grumman or Bollinger a blank check from the taxpayers? I can’t name any.
Next I would like to address your admitted lack of information in writing this article and in the conclusion you came to. I quote “Did the shipyard drop the ball or was the Coast Guard deficient in their contract administration? I honestly have no idea.” Given the importance of the national issues, and the unthoughtful conclusions you drew, shouldn’t you have done your homework. It’s all a matter of record; many oral depositions, millions of documents produced, pleadings…?
Now I come to your last point. “Finally, and perhaps most importantly, who will build these boats and others, if and when, years from now, the government triumphs?”
So we should leave poor management in place. Companies don’t go wrong. Rather, leaders and managers go wrong. The U.S. pleadings make evident that Bollinger could have made the right decision, but management chose not to do so. The cure is self-evident, bad decisions must carry responsibility. If the company doesn’t proactively police its managers, the whistlblowers and the government will do so. The performance bar need not be as low as you advocate.
President Dwight Eisenhower warned in his farewell address to the nation that the lack of accountability of the military-industrial complex could be the ruin of this great nation. How prophetic he was. The challenge is not a matter of millions, or even a reasonable number of billions, but it is now in the hundreds of billions or more. So, who wants higher taxes to cover incompetency or dishonest behavior? I can’t hear a single one of your readers….I am listening….
8/25/2011 5:54:43 PM
 
Michael DeKort
My name is Michael DeKort. I am the relator in the False Claims Act case filed in 2006 in order to recover the 123 refund from the current defendants, the prime contractors ICGS and joint venture Northrop Grumman. The U.S., myself and Lockheed Martin compromised and settled all claims regarding Lockheed Martin. However, I read your article and am quite concerned about its conclusion, and how it affects the Coast Guard, the taxpayer and the country and by your disregard of the relatively undisputed record facts and documents relating to the 123 fiasco. Your disregard of the record compiled in the United States District Court in Dallas, apparently lead you erroneous, misleading conclusions. Most harmful was your placement of fault on the back of the USCG. While their management may have left much to be desired, the Deepwater contract did not require any oversight of the contractors, nor did the contract require any services or consulting from the USCG. The Deepwater contract was a Performance Based contract and you totally missed that critical fact. More specifically, the Delivery Task Orders for all of the 110 conversions to 123s required the contractor, not the USCG, to do all of the design integration and all design and engineering required to produce a technically sound patrol boat which met the mandated performance specifications and applicable standards. The contractor, per the contract, was responsible for the adequacy of the design and the performance of the modified patrol boat—not the USCG, the customer in every respect.
Thus, from the beginning of project, the Coast Guard was never to be held accountable for any part of the contractor’s design, engineering or delivery of an apparent properly operating 123 foot patrol boat. Any installation of improper equipment or defective design or engineering was totally on the back of the contractor and its joint venturers. Notwithstanding 100% of the obligations accepted by the contractor, the Coast Guard’s Engineering Logistics Center (ELC) warned the contractors about hull design problems when ICGS/Northrop and Bollinger presented and promoted the 123s program to the USCG. If you want to review the scope of the contractors’ failures regarding the 123s, I would refer you to the Brief of Appellant for our appeal in US ex rel. DeKort v. ICGS, Northrop Grumman. The appeal succinctly states the issues, and it is more than adequately annotated. Neither contractor won anything on the merits at the District Court. Rather, the Court made an erroneous jurisdictional decision which we have appealed. Read it, and you will get an accurate picture of the fiasco. While Bollinger may share the blame, both Northrop Grumman and ICGS were responsible for anything improper done by Bollinger, their subcontractor. In fact, Northrop Grumman kept about $9 million of the budgeted $50 million of the expended modification funds for supervising Bollinger and its JV partner. Bollinger, through Northrop Grumman and ICGS, misrepresented material facts to the Coast Guard on multiple occasions regarding the hull design. They said all was well at every design review, when each boat was built and AFTER each hull buckled. The Coast Guard bears no responsibility whatsoever for the poor, systemic calculations, hull design flaws and/or false statements material to the contractors’ requests for payment from the USCG.
As for the DoJ who is bringing this “replication” of our whistleblower case, and the result it would have for the taxpayer and the country, let me address that by first posting your conclusion. “At a time when every federal penny (seemingly) should count, the U.S. Department of Justice is embarking on an ill-advised, potentially expensive and ultimately counterproductive legal action against the U.S. Coast Guard’s primary shipbuilding contractor. Go figure…”. Again, whoever wrote the article under your name failed to appreciate that the return of funds wrongfully obtained are significant amounts of money. Three times approximately $100 million is still a lot of taxpayer money, and the cost of the litigation compares favorably to the risk-reward considerations In the end, whatever judgment is recovered, it should be in the range of $150 million or more. Our claims are significantly larger due to additional claims we asserted. The litigation costs to the U.S. pale in comparison to the recoveries to which it is entitled under the False Claims Act It is everyone’s responsibility to go after contractor misconduct which contributes significantly to taxpayer losses and the resulting budget crisis. Is there no longer any will for accountability for contractors? Of course there is, and that is why the False Claims Act continues to be strengthened by Congress.
The contractors were delivered 8 operating 110 foot patrol boats. They were paid about $100 million for the modification of those 8 boats to 123 foot patrol boat. None of those boats will safely perform any mission required by the Deepwater contract. The contractors destroyed 8 working boats and kept $100 million for their destruction, never delivering performing 123s as required by the contract. The question is not why there is a whistleblower lawsuit that opened this wound, nor that the DOJ finally sued someone, but rather why aren’t there 100 other complainers who watched all of this happening. Who cares about the taxpayers losses of $100 million and the delivery of patrol boats unsafe for the USCG men and women? I did. And the DOJ does. Where are the rest of the you who watched the debacle unfold? Isn’t it time to come forward and communicate with my attorneys or the Department of Justice We will win without you, but we would much prefer to win with you.
As for Bollinger, a good track record does not excuse their poor workmanship and misleading conduct over the past 10 years. The 123 debacle was immensely avoidable. They knew that the boat could be lengthened properly, but that they underestimated how much that would cost. Instead of simply announcing that reality, they concealed those material facts and generated a financial and USCG disaster. We have alleged that the False Claims Act violations regarding hull design defects and other serious violations included the prime contractor ICGS, the prime contractor, and the joint venturer Northrop Grumman—which was delegated the ship modification responsibilities that it subcontracted to Bollinger. Even so, the United States has claimed that Bollinger also violated the False Claims Act, and it should bear its responsibility for its own conduct.
And as far as the Fast Response Cutter program is concerned there are reports that it has hull design flaw problems as well. Does the writer suggest that, given the 123s debacle, that we simply give ICGS, Northrop Grumman or Bollinger a blank check from the taxpayers? I can’t name any.
Next I would like to address your admitted lack of information in writing this article and in the conclusion you came to. I quote “Did the shipyard drop the ball or was the Coast Guard deficient in their contract administration? I honestly have no idea.” Given the importance of the national issues, and the unthoughtful conclusions you drew, shouldn’t you have done your homework. It’s all a matter of record; many oral depositions, millions of documents produced, pleadings…?
Now I come to your last point. “Finally, and perhaps most importantly, who will build these boats and others, if and when, years from now, the government triumphs?”
So we should leave poor management in place. Companies don’t go wrong. Rather, leaders and managers go wrong. The U.S. pleadings make evident that Bollinger could have made the right decision, but management chose not to do so. The cure is self-evident, bad decisions must carry responsibility. If the company doesn’t proactively police its managers, the whistlblowers and the government will do so. The performance bar need not be as low as you advocate.
President Dwight Eisenhower warned in his farewell address to the nation that the lack of accountability of the military-industrial complex could be the ruin of this great nation. How prophetic he was. The challenge is not a matter of millions, or even a reasonable number of billions, but it is now in the hundreds of billions or more. So, who wants higher taxes to cover incompetency or dishonest behavior? I can’t hear a single one of your readers….I am listening….
8/25/2011 5:55:22 PM
 
Michael DeKort
As it appears there is a size limit here I will post in sections.
My name is Michael DeKort. I am the relator in the False Claims Act case filed in 2006 in order to recover the 123 refund from the current defendants, the prime contractors ICGS and joint venture Northrop Grumman. The U.S., myself and Lockheed Martin compromised and settled all claims regarding Lockheed Martin. However, I read your article and am quite concerned about its conclusion, and how it affects the Coast Guard, the taxpayer and the country and by your disregard of the relatively undisputed record facts and documents relating to the 123 fiasco. Your disregard of the record compiled in the United States District Court in Dallas, apparently lead you erroneous, misleading conclusions. Most harmful was your placement of fault on the back of the USCG. While their management may have left much to be desired, the Deepwater contract did not require any oversight of the contractors, nor did the contract require any services or consulting from the USCG. The Deepwater contract was a Performance Based contract and you totally missed that critical fact. More specifically, the Delivery Task Orders for all of the 110 conversions to 123s required the contractor, not the USCG, to do all of the design integration and all design and engineering required to produce a technically sound patrol boat which met the mandated performance specifications and applicable standards. The contractor, per the contract, was responsible for the adequacy of the design and the performance of the modified patrol boat—not the USCG, the customer in every respect.
8/26/2011 10:00:34 AM
 
Michael DeKort
My name is Michael DeKort. I am the relator in the False Claims Act case filed in 2006 in order to recover the 123 refund from the current defendants, the prime contractors ICGS and joint venture Northrop Grumman. As there appears to be a size limit here please see my blog on this article at CGReport
8/26/2011 10:02:24 AM
 

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